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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FAITHFUL AGENCY VERSUS ORDINARY MEANING ADVOCACY

JAMES J. BRUDNEY*
INTRODUCTION
William Eskridge in his Childress Lecture observed that Justice Scalia—
call him a positivist or a textualist—“sees the role of the judge as being a
faithful agent, applying the authorized statutory texts according to [their]
ordinary meaning . . . . ”1
This asserted link between ordinary meaning and faithful agency is in part
constitutionally based. Justice Scalia and fellow ordinary meaning advocates
contend that the text and only the text reflects the Article I-sanctioned will of
the legislature as a whole.2 Accordingly, fidelity to Congress’s lawmaking
supremacy as a principle demands that courts as agents focus on interpreting
that text. Courts should derive ordinary meaning through careful attention to
linguistic clarification of the contested words and integration of those words
into the law’s overall structure. Professor John Manning adds a pragmatic
dimension to the ordinary meaning-faithful agent camp. He argues that because
congressional actors bargain “in complex and often unknowable ways over a
statute’s wording,” courts’ best (and perhaps only) hope as faithful agents is to
search for those underlying legislative preferences in the bargained-for text
itself.3

* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to St. Louis University
School of Law for organizing this Lecture, and to keynote lecturer William Eskridge and my
fellow panelists for their insights. Steve Della Fera provided valuable research support and
Cynthia Lamberty-Cameron furnished first-rate secretarial assistance. Fordham Law School
contributed generous financial support.
1. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Norms and Purposes in Legisprudence 5
(October 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Saint Louis University Law Journal). Like
Professor Eskridge, my focus is on the “hard case,” where the text is inconclusive and the judge
must make new law interstitially. Id.; see also text accompanying infra notes 28–31.
2. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518–19 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Wis.
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 622 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Alex Kozinski,
Should Reading Legislative History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807,
813 (1998); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.
J. 371, 375.
3. John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 33, 38 (2006); see also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106
975

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

976

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:975

The Court’s twenty-first century ordinary meaning analysis relies primarily
on two interpretive assets that represent contributions from or creations of the
judicial branch: dictionaries and language canons. In justifying their role as
faithful agents, ordinary meaning advocates typically do not invoke
congressionally-created interpretive assets distinct from the contested statutory
text. I refer most obviously to their discounting or rejecting legislative history.4
In addition, the ordinary meaning camp has at times minimized certain
separate textual provisions outside the contested statutory language but still
within the statute, such as purpose statements and statutory definitions.5
This Article contends that ordinary meaning analysis based on dictionaries
and language canons cannot be reconciled with the faithful agent model.
Fidelity to Congress as a principal entails fidelity to its lawmaking enterprise,
not to words or sentences divorced from that enterprise. Congress has indicated
that it does not value dictionaries as part of its lawmaking process, and it
ascribes at most limited weight to language canons in that process.6 Further,
Justices advocating ordinary meaning analysis too often use dictionary
definitions, and language canons such as the rule against surplusage, the whole
act rule, and ejusdem generis, in ways that are indifferent to Congress’s
background understandings when drafting and voting on statutory text.7
Indeed, given the extreme subjectivity of the Court’s dictionary approach and
the intrinsic malleability of the language canons, ordinary meaning analysis
reflects broad judicial discretion more than a commitment to the principalagency relationship. The interpretive asset most consistent with the Court’s
role as a faithful agent is instead legislative history.
Part I explains why the Court acts as something other than a faithful agent
when it engages in dictionary-based or canon-based ordinary meaning analysis.
Part II attempts to account for the Court’s substantial and growing interest in
ordinary meaning as the primary basis of its interpretive approach. Part II also
contends that the Court’s faithful agent role is better fulfilled through use of
the congressionally created and endorsed asset of legislative history.

COLUM. L. REV. 70, 99, 102–03 (2006); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91
VA. L. REV. 419, 438 (2005).
4. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 369–90 (2012); sources cited supra note 2.
5. See Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Oh. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 161, 168, 191 (1989) (ignoring
purpose provision); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 568–76 (1995) (discounting
statutory definition).
6. See Parts I.A.1 and I.B.1 infra.
7. See Parts I.A.2 and I.B.2 infra.
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I. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN ORDINARY MEANING AND FAITHFUL AGENCY
When today’s Supreme Court seeks to determine the meaning of a disputed
statutory word or phrase, it relies on two interpretive tools that were far less
commonly employed a generation earlier. Although the Justices’ use of
dictionaries was virtually non-existent prior to the Rehnquist era,8 the Court
now invokes dictionary definitions in about one-third of its statutory
interpretation majority opinions.9 The increase in language canon usage over
recent decades is less dramatic but still striking, with the modern Court relying
on language canons in over one-fourth of its statutory interpretation
majorities.10
The Court’s newfound interest in these two resources is due to their central
role in enabling the Court to examine and discern ordinary meaning. Setting
aside for the moment other explanations for the Court’s focus on ordinary
meaning analysis,11 any attempt to link this approach to the Court’s role as
faithful agent is highly problematic.
A.

Dictionaries
1.

Congress’s Perspective

In deciding whether judicial use of dictionary definitions promotes faithful
agency, it is worth paying some attention to how Congress regards this
resource in relation to its drafting of statutory language. Lawmakers have not
chosen to incorporate dictionaries as an approved or presumptive source of
textual meaning.12 They often include their own definitions of key terms as a

8. The Court used dictionaries in eighty-nine total opinions during the Burger Court era,
from 1969 to 1986; this amounts to less than 1.5% of all Court opinions during that period. See
Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United
States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 252–60, n.181–82 (1999)
[hereinafter Thumma & Kirchmeier, Lexicon]; United States Supreme Court Database,
http://scdb.wustl.edu (last visited Feb. 19, 2012) (disclosing that Burger Court issued 6,013 total
opinions).
9. See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst
for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 32–33), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2195644 (calculating Roberts Court usage for 2008–2010 terms in statutory cases from criminal
law, workplace law, and business and commercial law).
10. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation:
Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231,
1256 (2009) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear, Warp & Woof] (calculating Court’s usage from
1987 to 2008 in statutory cases from tax law and workplace law).
11. See infra Part II.A (discussing possible additional reasons for the Court’s new emphasis
on ordinary meaning).
12. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 275, 299 (1998); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of
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separate section of a particular statute,13 but the U.S. Code includes no default
to dictionary definitions where the statute has failed to define a given word.
This silence does not seem inadvertent. In its so-called Dictionary Act,14
setting forth presumed meanings for certain recurring words and verbal
formulations, the default is not to Webster’s Third New International or the
Oxford English Dictionary. Rather, the meanings specified by Congress apply
“unless the context indicates otherwise.”15
Moreover, a new study of Congress’s drafting processes strongly suggests
that members and staff do not consult dictionaries when they draft statutory
text.16 Scholars had long maintained this to be the case in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.17 But the study by Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa
Bressman indicates that dictionaries are “mostly irrelevant to the drafting
process,” based on interviews they conducted in 2011–2012 with over 130
attorneys responsible for writing statutes while serving as committee counsels
or in the offices of House and Senate Legislative Counsel.18 More than half of
those interviewed stated that dictionaries are almost never used when Congress
is drafting, even as staff acknowledged that the Court often relies on them.19
2.

The Court’s Approach

A number of legal scholars have noted that the Court’s use of dictionaries
has risen dramatically starting with the Rehnquist Court.20 In a forthcoming

Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1320–
21 (1990).
13. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006); Toxic Substances Control Act
of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2602 (2006); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2006);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
14. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (D. Mass.
2002) (explaining that the Dictionary Act “provides general definitions for a handful of words
appearing within the code, along with general rules of construction, that apply to the entire code
in the absence of a more specific indication within the statute being analyzed”).
15. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The Supreme Court at times has identified the canon of ordinary
meaning as a default. See, e.g., Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). But the Court has
also proclaimed the opposite canon of honoring Congress’s unconventional or more limited
meaning. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 706 n.9 (2000); Bos. Sand & Gravel
Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
16. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside:
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and The Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with Saint Louis University Law Journal).
17. See Aprill, supra note 12, at 299; Zeppos, supra note 12, at 1320–21.
18. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16 (manuscript at 27). The study devotes primary
attention to how drafters view the canons and legislative history. Its findings on those issues are
discussed infra at Parts I.B and II.B.
19. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16 (manuscript at 27).
20. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 12, at 277–78; Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First:
Curbing the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary When Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
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coauthored article analyzing the Court’s dictionary usage, Lawrence Baum and
I identify numerous decisions in which Rehnquist and Roberts Court majorities
rely on dictionary-based ordinary meaning to discount or reject consideration
of congressionally created interpretive resources.21 Several illustrative cases
warrant brief discussion.
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., Justice Thomas for the majority
relies on the dictionary definitions of a key antidiscrimination phrase (“because
of”) in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to justify rejecting
Congress’s quite different construction of that very same phrase in Title VII.22
Congress had deliberately copied its 1964 Title VII language into the 1967
ADEA, and the Court in 1989 had given the Title VII phrase a meaning that
Congress two years later approved in the text and legislative history that were
part of its 1991 additions to Title VII.23 But in 2009, the Court in Gross
determined that the dictionary-based ordinary meaning of the phrase should
govern under the ADEA, as opposed to the congressionally expressed
understanding.24
This past term, in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., Justice Alito for
the majority concluded that the ordinary meaning of “interpreter,” in a federal
statute authorizing district courts to award costs to prevailing parties for
“compensation of interpreters,” covers oral translation but not the costs of
translating documents.25 The majority relied primarily on definitions from
numerous dictionaries, choosing not to credit Congress’s apparent background
understanding of the term “interpreter.”26 District judges—the audience at
which the statute is aimed—had awarded document translation as well as oral
translation costs in cases prior to the 1978 enactment specifically authorizing
compensation for these interpreters.27 And the congressional committee that
drafted the 1978 Court Interpreters Act, presumably aware of this practice,
emphasized Congress’s expansive purpose of assuring meaningful access to
federal courts.28 Notwithstanding the Court’s thorough dictionary-based

& PUB. POL’Y 401, 415 (2003); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the
Lexicon Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First
Century, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 79 (2010); Thumma & Kirchmeier, Lexicon, supra note 8, at
252–60; Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1437, 1437 (1994).
21. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 9 (manuscript at 68–78).
22. 557 U.S. 167, 175–77 (2009) (addressing “because of”).
23. Id. at 183–86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 176.
25. 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2000 (2012).
26. Id. at 2002–04.
27. Id. at 2008–09 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 2009 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing to Senate committee report).
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ordinary meaning analysis, it is difficult to argue that the refusal to credit
congressional sources or understandings fulfills a faithful agent role.
Ordinary meaning advocates are not just prepared to reject or ignore
evidence of congressional understanding from closely analogous statutes or
legislative history. They also are willing to downplay or reject statutory
definitions from the law in question. Professor Eskridge points to an instance
of this downplaying in Justice Scalia’s Sweet Home dissent, where Scalia urges
that a congressional definition be read narrowly when it is in derogation of
established meanings.29 Assuming arguendo that most of the other verbs in
Congress’s definition of “take” entail direct targeting of the endangered
species, Congress included the effects-oriented verb “harm” as part of that
definition.30 It surely does not reflect faithful agency to maintain that
congressionally enacted definitions should be subordinated to judicially
constructed ordinary meaning. A faithful agent perspective is more likely to
suggest that when the statutory definition includes one or more examples of an
unconventional or uncommon sense of the word defined, that definitional sense
should prevail as Congress’s will.31
Rejecting congressional definitions in favor of dictionary-based ordinary
meaning extends beyond minority views like Scalia’s. In Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., Inc., Justice Kennedy for the Court held that the term “prospectus” in the
1933 Securities Act referred only to documents describing a public offering of
securities, even though Congress had unequivocally defined that term broadly
enough to cover private sales.32 The Court relied heavily on 1930s dictionary
definitions of “prospectus” to narrow the scope of the statutory term.33 In doing
so, the majority effectively ignored Congress’s intent as set forth not only in its
own definition but also in the statute’s extensive drafting history and in
contemporaneous understandings expressed by legal scholars who helped draft
the language, including then-law professors Felix Frankfurter and William O.
Douglas.34 In Gustafson as well as the two other dictionary-based decisions

29. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a Jurisprudence of
Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865 (2013) (text accompanying note
44) (relying on Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 718–19
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
30. In fact, Congress included several other non-targeting, effects-oriented verbs in the same
definition, such as “harass,” “wound,” and “kill.” The inclusion of “harm” is not therefore unique
or even rare. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006).
31. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 706–07, n.9 (2000) (adopting an
unconventional meaning of a key statutory term in order to fulfill clear congressional policy).
32. 513 U.S. 561, 568–84 (1995).
33. See id. at 575–76.
34. See id. at 584–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (invoking Congress’s broad statutory
definition); id. at 599–601 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (invoking drafting history and
contemporaneous understandings).
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discussed above, it was conservative Justices who invoked ordinary meaning to
preclude reliance on congressionally generated resources.35
One further element indicates a disconnect between the Court’s patterns of
dictionary use and faithful agency. Both liberal and conservative Justices are
strikingly subjective and ad hoc in their dictionary choices. The Justices
typically invoke one or at most two dictionaries; they have adopted
individualized brand preferences that they then apply unevenly; they use
general and legal dictionaries interchangeably and with no apparent rationale;
and they similarly lack any predominant practice regarding use of dictionaries
published close to statutory enactment date, to case-filing date, or neither.36
The Justices’ casually opportunistic approach suggests that they use
dictionaries to buttress their own independently preferred positions. That
approach hardly seems consistent with a role as faithful implementer of
congressional preferences or priorities.
B.

Language Canons
1.

Congress’s Perspective

The conventional understanding of scholars and at least some federal
judges is that members of Congress are largely unaware of the canons’
existence, much less their role in judicial construction of statutes.37 Until
recently, available empirical evidence indicated that canons are a peripheral
asset in the statutory drafting process; committee counsel and House and
Senate legislative drafters invoke them infrequently when composing and
negotiating over text.38

35. Similarly, for examples of conservative decisions using dictionary-based ordinary
meaning to foreclose reliance on longstanding agency interpretations acquiesced to by Congress,
see Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2170–71 (2012) (Alito, J.); Janus
Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) (Thomas, J.);
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 367 (1998) (Scalia, J.). Liberal
Justices employ ordinary meaning analysis in their majorities as well, but not in order to ignore or
diminish evidence from the politically accountable branches. Instead, dictionary-based ordinary
meaning for these liberal Justices tends to play a distinctly subsidiary, even ornamental, role
alongside reliance on other factors including legislative history, purpose, and agency deference.
See Brudney & Baum, supra note 9 (manuscript at 83–85).
36. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 9 (manuscript at 23–24, 40–48).
37. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 193 (2008); Robert A. Katzmann,
Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political
Theory, 80 GEO. L. J. 653, 662–65 (1992); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U.
PITT. L. REV. 627, 629–31 (1987); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 806 (1983).
38. See Victoria F. Nourse and Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600–04 (2002).
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The Gluck and Bressman study presents a more nuanced picture regarding
the role of language canons. Counsel engaged in drafting generally do pay
some attention to the semantic canons that address the negative implication
from expressing certain things (expressio unius) and the positive implications
from lists of associated words (ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis).39
On the other hand, Gluck and Bressman report that structural canons,
disfavoring superfluous or redundant language or promoting consistent usage
like the whole act and whole code rules, are largely ignored in the drafting
process.40 Congressional counsel know that courts tend to apply these
structural canons, but counsel still don’t follow them when drafting, primarily
because of conflict with Congress’s own institutional needs. Drafters prefer to
err on the side of redundancy both to guard against inadvertent omissions and
to satisfy the political interest of key swing members, lobbyists, or
constituents.41 And counsel reject canons promoting consistent usage because
committees are insulated from one another, they often draft different parts of a
single statute, and omnibus statutes reflect contributions by multiple
committees.42 Consequently, there is little interest in having particular terms
apply consistently across unrelated statutes or even a single statute.43
Congress’s perspective on the canons as a guide to textual drafting is less
uniformly hostile or indifferent than was the case for dictionaries. Still, the fact
that presumptions against redundancy and in favor of consistent usage are
consciously ignored, discounted, or rejected by congressional drafters tends to
undermine any suggestion that the canons’ widely accepted judicial role is a
matter of faithful agency.
2.

The Court’s Approach

A defining feature of both the semantic canons that Congress to some
extent cares about and the structural canons that it evidently ignores is their
malleability. Canon proponents like Justice Scalia defend this malleability by
noting that a canon’s persuasive force may properly be overcome by an
interpretive factor that is more persuasive under the circumstances.44 Skeptical
observers, from Professor Karl Llewellyn to Judge Richard Posner, refer to the
language canons’ malleability as closer to an indeterminacy that enables or

39. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16 (manuscript at 22–23).
40. Id. at 23–25.
41. See id. at 31–33.
42. See id. at 33–34.
43. See id. at 31–34.
44. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 25–27 (1997).
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encourages creative interpretation in furtherance of judicially preferred
values.45
A previous co-authored study addressing the Court’s use of the canons in
workplace law cases over thirty-five years concludes that whatever else may be
true regarding their malleability, the language canons are frequently used to
frustrate or undermine Congress’s intent and purpose.46 The study identifies
numerous Rehnquist Court decisions in which the majority relied on language
canons without legislative history and the dissent relied on legislative history.47
Because the dissent in these cases embraced legislative record evidence, the
study hypothesized that the canons were being used to frustrate or undermine
Congress’s discoverable preferences.48
With respect to the language canons cases, eight of the nine decisions
refusing to consider legislative history involved pro-employer or conservative
opinions authored by conservative Justices.49 Two examples illustrate how the
majority used language canon analysis to determine that the ordinary meaning
of text was so clear the Court should not even consider legislative history
pointing in the opposite direction.
Probably the most notorious instance is Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.50 The issue presented was the
scope of the Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption for “contracts of employment
. . . of workers engaged in . . . commerce.”51 The Court had earlier held that the

45. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 277–82 (1985);
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950).
46. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear, Canons].
47. See id. at 68, 78–79 (discussing nine such language canon cases as well as ten
substantive canon cases). For a language canon example from the Roberts Court, see Chamber of
Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1980–82, 1985 (2011) (Roberts, J.,
majority opinion) (relying on canons of consistent usage and expressio unius and rejecting
reliance on legislative history); id. at 1993–94 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (relying on legislative
history); id. at 1999–2001 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (relying on legislative history).
48. Brudney & Ditslear, Canons, supra note 46, at 68.
49. See id. at 68–69, 78–79. Because federal workplace law is broadly unidirectional in
favor of employees, one might infer that legislative history accompanying laws such as Title VII,
the NLRA, ERISA, or the ADA will be liberal or pro-employee. However, liberal Justices
authoring majority opinions in these same workplace law cases are actually somewhat more likely
to reach conservative pro-employer results when they rely on legislative history than when they
do not. This set of findings reflects the fact that the legislative record evidence includes a range of
compromise-related materials taken seriously by liberal Justices. See James J. Brudney & Corey
Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia
Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 146–60 (2008) [hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear,
Legislative History].
50. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
51. Id. at 109; 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (emphasis added).
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FAA’s basic coverage language, providing for the enforceability of written
arbitration provisions in “a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce,”52 signified Congress’s intent to regulate to the full extent of its
commerce power.53 But the Court in Circuit City relied on ejusdem generis to
hold that the “workers” engaged in commerce under the employment
exemption language were limited by specific listed examples to transportationrelated enterprises.54 The FAA legislative history, which the majority deemed
irrelevant in light of the Act’s plain meaning, made clear that the FAA drafters
and supporters never anticipated or intended that the law would cover any
employment contracts at all. Bill proponents, led by Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover, added the employment exemption at the request of organized
labor simply to reaffirm this prior understanding, and the amendment led the
labor movement to withdraw its opposition.55
The second illustrative case is Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., in which the
issue was whether corrective or mitigating measures should be considered
when determining if an individual is disabled under the Americans With
Disabilities Act.56 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, rejected as
impermissible the approach adopted by the Justice Department and EEOC that
individuals were to be evaluated in their uncorrected state (e.g., without
hearing aids, prosthetic limbs, or diabetes medications).57 The Court relied
heavily on the whole act rule, emphasizing the ADA findings section
declaration that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities.”58 The majority concluded that this figure could not
possibly be squared with an “uncorrected” approach that would cover at least
one hundred million people.59 In order to avoid rendering the forty-three
million figure meaningless, the Court held that the figure “gives content to the
ADA’s terms, specifically the term ‘disability.’”60 Further, under this language

52. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (emphasis added).
53. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995).
54. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114–15 (reasoning that the residual phrase “any other class
of workers engaged in [interstate] commerce” is preceded by reference to seamen and railroad
employees). Justice Kennedy invoked additional ordinary meaning analysis to explain why
“commerce” meant something different in the basic coverage section. He reasoned that the phrase
“involving commerce” in the basic coverage section was a passive formulation to be construed
broadly, whereas the phrase “engaged in commerce” in the employment exemption section
required active participation and therefore had a more limited jurisdictional scope. Id. at 115–16.
55. See id. at 126–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
57. See id. at 482.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990); see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484–87.
59. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 486–87.
60. Id. at 487.
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canon analysis, the text was so clear that the Court declined to consider
extensive and uniformly contrary legislative history.61
The Court’s reliance on language canons to establish an unambiguously
plain or ordinary meaning is not the province of conservative Justices alone. In
the criminal law area, liberal Justices have invoked language canons to reach
pro-defendant results while precluding consideration of contrary indications
from the legislative record. In Ratzlaf v. United States,62 the issue was what the
government must prove to convict an individual of “willfully violating” the
anti-structuring provision of the Money-Laundering Control Act.63 Justice
Ginsburg for the Court relied heavily on the rule against surplusage to hold for
the defendant, reasoning that there could be no conviction unless the person
who structured the transaction had specific knowledge that structuring was
illegal, not simply that evading a bank’s reporting requirements was unlawful
activity.64 Ginsburg concluded that because the text was so clear, she would
not resort to contrary legislative history to “cloud” the Court’s textual
analysis.65
Similarly, in Begay v. United States,66 the issue was whether the state
felony offense of driving under the influence (DUI) qualifies as a “violent
felony” under the Armed Career Criminals Act.67 Justice Breyer for the Court
relied heavily on ejusdem generis and the rule against surplusage to conclude
that the federal statute’s listed examples of violent felonies—burglary, arson,
extortion, or using explosives—illustrate and limit the range of included
misconduct, and the DUI offense is outside that limit.68 The dissent objected
inter alia that the Court was ignoring the clear judgment of Congress in its
construction of the Act’s enhanced sentencing framework.69

61. Justice Stevens in his dissent found that the text was not unambiguously clear and he
therefore consulted the ADA legislative history, which established the exact opposite
understanding within the House and Senate committee reports from the conclusion reached by the
majority. See id. at 499–501 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, the committee report
understanding was identical to the position taken by all three executive branch agencies charged
with construing the ADA. See id. at 496, 501.
62. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
63. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1986); see also Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 139–40.
64. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140–41, 144–46.
65. Id. at 147–48. Justice Blackmun in dissent relied heavily on legislative history to show
that Congress meant to criminalize individual behavior like Ratzlaf’s. See id. at 157–60
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (relying on two committee reports plus hearing testimony from the
Deputy Attorney General).
66. 553 U.S. 137, 139 (2008).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006).
68. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 142, 144–45. Breyer does not name these two canons, but he is
utilizing them in substance.
69. See id. at 161 (Alito, Souter, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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Semantic canons such as ejusdem generis and structural canons like the
rule against surplusage are not inherently conservative or liberal. But in the
Court’s hands they often turn out to be anti-legislative. The presumption that
statutes should be understood as structurally integrated with no surplus phrases
or provisions is at odds with the drafting realities that produce Congress’s
complex statutory schemes such as ERISA, Title VII, or the Securities
Exchange Act, schemes that are often replete with linguistic residues and
repetitions.70 And the more beguiling presumption that general words
following an enumeration of specifics are limited by the class specifically
mentioned is subject to principled disagreement as well as manipulative abuse.
In many instances, these language canons happen to point in the same direction
as direct, tangible evidence of legislative intent.71 But when they point in the
opposite direction, as in the illustrative cases described above and numerous
others, the Court’s determination to rely on the canons and refuse even to
consider available legislative evidence cannot be justified under a faithful
agent rationale.
II. LIMITING JUDICIAL DISCRETION
A.

Alternative Explanations for Ordinary Meaning

Despite these faithful agency problems, the Court’s ordinary meaning
focus has become a primary factor in its approach to statutory interpretation.
Reliance on dictionaries and language canons to discern ordinary meaning is
promoted by liberals and conservatives, purposivists as well as textualists.
Ordinary meaning is almost always the initial element in the Court’s analysis
of a contested statutory provision, and it is often the dispositive element, as
well. If faithful agent status cannot justify this approach, how then should we
account for it?
One factor is the abiding influence of Justice Scalia. From the moment he
joined the Court, Scalia has forcefully articulated a distinctive vision of how
courts should interpret statutes. He was the first Rehnquist Court Justice to
author numerous opinions invoking dictionary definitions as a positive
interpretive resource,72 just as he took the lead in authoring separate opinions
70. See Brudney & Ditslear, Canons, supra note 46, at 104.
71. See, e.g., New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2640–41 (2010) (majority
relies on whole act rule and legislative history); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 62–63 (2006) (majority relies on expressio unius and legislative history); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 625 (1997) (majority relies on in pari materia and
legislative history).
72. Thumma & Kirchmeier, Lexicon, supra note 8, at 261 (“Justice Scalia has relied on the
dictionary more times than any other justice in the history of the Supreme Court.”); id. at 253–56
n.181 (identifying thirteen separate Scalia opinions using dictionary in 1986 to 1991 terms plus
eleven Scalia-authored majorities during same period).
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condemning any reliance on legislative history as a resource.73 And Scalia has
emphasized the central role of language canons both in his Court opinions74
and in his separate high-profile writings about interpretation.75 Justice Scalia’s
relentless pursuit of ordinary meaning rather than intended meaning has clearly
had an impact on some of his colleagues—due to the persuasive force of his
reasoning, the chilling effect from his censorious opinions, or perhaps both.76
A second factor is the accessibility and convenience of these two
resources. Dictionaries are easy for judges to consult and language canons are
off-the-rack rules of thumb that judges can invoke sua sponte. Unlike
legislative history, there is little research or complexity involved in calling
upon ordinary meaning interpretive assets. Nor does the Court need to depend
on the parties to present arguments in their briefs regarding these resources.
Indeed, judges regularly invoke dictionary definitions that the parties have not
raised at all.77
A third factor is the Court’s interest in ordinary meaning as a coordination
tool. Judges following this approach from the start can promote the consistency
and content-neutrality of results reached across different subject matter areas.78
This coordination function becomes stronger when ordinary meaning analysis
is viewed as presumptively sufficient, not just a necessary starting point.
Finally, there is an institutional self-protection rationale. During the 1970s
and the 1980s, the Supreme Court was repeatedly criticized in the media and
law reviews as activist and ideological.79 Congress also overrode Supreme

73. Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 49, at 161 (listing twelve separate
opinions criticizing majority’s use of legislative history from 1987–89); Brudney & Baum, supra
note 9 (manuscript at 11 n.20) (listing three more separate opinions in 1990 and 1991).
74. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257–59 (1993) (relying on consistent
usage and whole act rule); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 132–33 (1989) (relying
on expressio unius).
75. See SCALIA, supra note 44, at 25–27; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 4, at 69–233
(discussing approvingly more than thirty semantic and structural canons).
76. See generally Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 49, at 160–68.
77. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 9 (manuscript at 45) (reporting that twenty-eight
percent of the words with dictionary citations in a majority opinion did not have such citations in
briefs submitted by parties or the United States as an amicus).
78. See Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and
Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 833 (2008) (contending that repeated use of and advocacy
for textualist method leads to increased entrenchment of that method because future jurists find
the method more trustworthy and because consistency with past practice diminishes scrutiny from
Congress and minimizes opposition in general).
79. For illustrations of concern expressed in the press, see, for example, Daniel Chu & Diane
Camper, The Supreme Court: Days of Decision, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1976, at 83, 83–84; Richard
L. Strout, Social Issues Fall to Court, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 7, 1980, at 3, 3; Stuart
Taylor, Jr., The ‘Judicial Activists’ are Always on the Other Side, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1988, at
E5, E5. For concerns voiced by legal scholars, see, for example, John Hart Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924–26 (1973); Robert F. Nagel, A
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Court decisions during this period substantially more often than it had in prior
years.80 Faced with a barrage of attacks on its neutrality and willingness to
exercise restraint, the Court may have sought to insulate itself going forward.
Citing dictionary definitions as “linguistic authority” for language-based
conclusions subtly analogizes dictionaries to judicial precedent.81 And disputes
over the meaning of abstract Latin phrases or venerable structural maxims may
seem respectably neutral and law-like to judges and the attorneys who argue
before them.82 In addition, the notion of ordinary meaning resources as
objective and precise contrasts with the assertedly political and messy nature of
legislative history, which is said to create greater risks of judicial misuse.83
Each of these factors has likely contributed to the ascent of ordinary
meaning analysis. With respect to the rationale involving institutional selfprotection, however, a word of caution is in order. The claim that the
interpretive turn from intended meaning to ordinary meaning creates more
neutral or objective or authoritative judicial reasoning rests in large part on a
false dichotomy between law and politics. Courts regularly exercise
considerable discretion when applying dictionaries and language canons, just
as they do when applying legislative history. Part B below discusses how the
Supreme Court’s approach to legislative history reflects genuine faithful agent
status when construing contested statutory text. But apart from our faithful
agent focus, it is worth noting that the objective standards available to monitor
and assess judicial misuse of legislative history are stronger than anything that
exists with respect to the canons or dictionaries. The Court has long recognized
a presumptive hierarchy of reliable legislative history resources based on the

Comment on the Burger Court and “Judicial Activism”, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 223, 230–31
(1981). See also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Is There a Distinctive Conservative Jurisprudence?, 73
U. COLO. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2002) (federal appellate court judge describing the Warren and
Burger Courts as periods of “excessive activism”). The Court was criticized for its policymaking
activism by presidents as well, including Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. See Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367, 1368
(1996).
80. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991) (reporting increase from six Supreme Court overrides
per congressional session from 1967–74 to twelve overrides per session from 1975–90).
81. See Hoffman, supra note 20, at 412; James L. Weis, Comment, Jurisprudence By
Webster’s: The Role of the Dictionary in Legal Thought, 39 MERCER L. REV. 961, 963 (1988).
82. See R. N. Graham, In Defence of Maxims, 22 STATUTE L. REV. 45, 46 (2001)
(suggesting that language canons, while not hard and fast rules, be viewed as “a code of ‘statutory
grammar’ that helps us understand patterns of language found in legislative texts”).
83. These risks are, first, that legislators or staff will “craft statements in the legislative
record with an eye toward manipulating or misleading judges as to the meaning of text” and,
second, that “judges reviewing the abundant legislative commentary from bill proponents and
opponents may selectively invoke portions” to help justify their preferred outcomes. See Brudney
& Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 49, at 119.
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structure of congressional lawmaking.84 By contrast, the Court has never
identified a framework of authoritative priorities that might limit judicial
discretion when invoking either of these two ordinary-meaning assets.85
B.

Legislative History and Faithful Agency
1.

Congress’s Perspective

As noted at the outset, two core textualist contentions are that reliance on
ordinary meaning rather than statements from congressional subgroups signals
respect for legislative supremacy, and that bargained-for text rather than
legislative history is the best—if not the only—evidence reflecting genuine
congressional preferences.86 One might ask whether members of Congress and
their key staffs have voiced similar observations discounting the importance of
legislative history. In fact, their observations run in the exact opposite
direction.
Starting in the late 1980s, a range of current and former members of
Congress began endorsing from a faithful agency perspective the importance
of relying on legislative history to help discern the meaning of statutes.
Democrats with extensive experience in the House have identified committee
reports as the “bone structure” of a federal statute, performing a “central
explanatory function” and resolving ambiguities.87 They contend that for
“most” members, “legislative history can explain and amplify legislative
language in ways that are instructive to the courts” as well as colleagues.88
Perhaps more important, prominent Republicans from the Senate and House
have concluded that it would be inappropriate if courts followed the Scalia

84. See notes 106–20 infra and accompanying text.
85. See Brudney & Baum, supra note 9 (manuscript at 30–50, 80) (addressing dictionaries);
James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98
CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1202–05, 1229–32 (2010) (addressing language canons).
86. See text accompanying notes 2–3 supra.
87. Mikva, supra note 37, at 631. Democratic Rep. Mikva served in Congress from 1969 to
1973 and 1975 to 1979. He was an appellate judge on the D.C. Circuit from 1979 to 1997, and
served as White House Counsel from 1994 to 1995. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U. S.
CONG., MIKVA, ABNER JOSEPH, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=m000
703 (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
88. Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legis. History: Hearing Before Subcomm. On
Courts, Intellectual Prop. and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 2 (1990) [hereinafter Stat. Interp. Hearing] (Statement of Chairman Robert Kastenmeier).
Rep. Kastenmeier served in Congress from 1959 to 1991, and chaired the Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Courts from 1969 to 1991. Short Biography of Robert W. Kastenmeier,
WISCONSIN HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/dictionary/index.asp?action=
view&term_id=2084&search_term=kastenmeier (last visited Oct. 29, 2012); see also Senator
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Who Needs the Legislative Veto?, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685, 695–701
(1984) (invoking legislative history in the foreign policy context).
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approach and refused to consider legislative record evidence.89 Republicans in
Congress emphasized that even as members of the minority they often looked
to majority committee report explanations to understand what they were voting
on,90 and that legislative history can help provide focus for generally worded
statutory text, contribute context and meaning when a provision is produced
during floor debate, and prevent slippage from agreements reached within
Congress.91
Although some members of Congress have complained that committee
report language goes unnoticed by other legislators,92 the fact that members of

89. Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 43, 45–48 (1988). See Stat. Interp. Hearing, supra note 88, at 65, 67–68 (statement
of Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead); Republican Senator Hatch has been a member of the Senate since
1979, and served as chair or ranking member of the Judiciary Committee from 1993 to 2005.
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U. S. CONG., HATCH, ORRIN GRANT, http://bioguide.con
gress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000338 (last visited Jan. 21, 2013). Republican Rep.
Moorhead served in the House from 1973 to 1997 and was ranking minority member of the
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts from 1982 to 1994, and chair from 1995 to 1996.
Interview with Representative Carlos Moorhead, THE THIRD BRANCH, http://www.uscourts.
gov/News/TheThirdBranch/95-03-01/Interview_with_Representative_Carlos_J_Moorhead.aspx
(last visited Oct. 29, 2012). See also infra note 93 (identifying support for legislative history
expressed by several Republican senators at confirmation hearings from 1993 to 2010).
90. See Stat. Interp. Hearing, supra note 88, at 21 (statement of Judge James Buckley); Joan
Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress’ Will, 48 CONG. Q. 913, 917 (1990)
(reporting Senator Specter’s view). Judge Buckley served as a Conservative U.S. Senator from
1971 to 1977 prior to being appointed to the D.C. Circuit. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.
S. CONG., BUCKLEY, JAMES LANE, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=
B001026 (last visited Jan. 21, 2013). Senator Specter served as a U.S. Senator, first for the
Republican party and then later the Democrats, from 1981 to 2011, and was an influential
member of the Judiciary Committee. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U. S. CONG., SPECTER,
ARLEN http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000709 (last visited Jan. 21,
2013).
91. Hatch, supra note 89, at 45–48; see also Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 637, 653–54 (2012) [hereinafter Katzmann, Statutes] (discussing how legislators and staff
from off the committee “accept the trustworthiness of statements made by their colleagues . . . [in
committee reports] about what the proposed legislation means,” and observing that “[t]he system
works because committee members and their staffs will lose influence with their colleagues as to
future bills if they do not accurately represent the bills under consideration within their
jurisdiction.”).
92. See e.g., 128 CONG. REC. 16,802, 16,918–19 (1982) (statement of Sen. William
Armstrong); 98 CONG. REC. 7,273, 7,299 (1952) (statement of Rep. Thomas Jenkins). Justice
Scalia has regularly invoked the critique offered by Republican Senator Armstrong, who served
from 1979 to 1991. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U. S. CONG., ARMSTRONG, WILLIAM
LESTER http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=A000219 (last visited Jan. 21,
2013). As I have previously pointed out, Scalia’s edited reproduction of Senator Armstrong’s
floor exchange with Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert Dole omits key remarks from
Dole that emphasize the bipartisan and interbranch collaborative nature of committee reports in
the tax law area. See Brudney & Ditslear, Warp & Woof, supra note 10, at 1292–93.
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both parties have continued to participate in creating, negotiating, and relying
on these reports as well as other legislative history suggests that such
comments are isolated voices of protest. Further evidence that members of
Congress believe strongly in the relevance of legislative history is apparent in
statements by senators from both parties during numerous Supreme Court
confirmation hearings since 1993.93 To be sure, the probative weight of
particular legislative history with respect to a given statutory dispute requires a
sifting of the enactment record to determine which history is truly on point or
is “most proximate” to the text itself.94 But the challenges involved in this
judicial undertaking are challenges that Congress expects the Court will
attempt to meet in good faith as its agent.
Stepping back, bipartisan support for the value of legislative history is not
surprising given the complex realities of the democratic lawmaking process.
The ambiguities and incompleteness of statutory language reflect in part
Congress’s understanding of the need to draft certain rules in general terms so
as to minimize the risk of erroneous or absurd applications of an overly
detailed text. Such drafting flexibility also provides agencies with sufficient
room to perform their delegated interpretive responsibilities.95
One subject-specific example of how legislative history contributes to
Congress’s operational processes involves major tax legislation. Committee
reports accompanying such tax bills have typically featured hundreds of pages
of explanatory material produced in a bipartisan fashion with substantial input
from the Executive Branch.96 These committee reports can perform a mini-

93. See, e.g., Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court
of the U. S. Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 223–25 (1993) (statement of Sen.
William Cohen) (republican); id. at 325–26 (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D);
Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U. S. Before
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 170–74 (1994) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley, R);
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the U. S.
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 318–19 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley, R); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A.
Alito, Jr. to be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U. S. Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 503 (2006) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley, R); The Nomination of
Elena Kagan to be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U. S. Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 219–20 (2010) (statement of Sen. Alan Franken, D); The Nomination of
Elena Kagan to be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U. S. Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 507–09 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, R).
94. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by
the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 109–10 (2012).
95. See Peter L. Strauss, When The Judge Is Not the Primary Official With Responsibility to
Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321,
337–38 (1990).
96. See Brudney & Ditslear, Warp & Woof, supra note 10, at 1280–83 and sources cited
therein.
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regulation function if, as often occurs, it takes years for the Treasury
Department to issue formal rules in specific subject areas.97 A second instance
of how legislative history reflects Congress’s lawmaking habits involves labor
and civil rights statutes, where the legislative process tends to be far more
partisan. Rather than performing a mini-regulatory role, committee reports—
and then floor debates and conference reports—often reveal or confirm the
existence of compromise arrangements on a particular issue, negotiated among
interested legislators and affected constituencies.98
Finally, recent studies involving congressional staff primarily responsible
for drafting statutory language make clear that, like their elected bosses,
committee counsel and legislative attorneys view legislative history as a
central part of the lawmaking enterprise. Professors Victoria Nourse and Jane
Schacter interviewed Senate Judiciary Committee counsel from both parties in
the late 1990s and found that these key players regarded legislative history as
integral to their efforts—in explaining textual meaning and in securing
collective action through negotiated agreement.99 The more recent study by
Professors Gluck and Bressman amplifies and deepens these earlier findings.100
Based on interviews with over 130 attorneys, they concluded that “legislative
history was emphatically viewed by almost all of our respondents—Republican
and Democrat alike—as the most important drafting and interpretive tool
apart from text.”101 These counsel recognized that some forms of legislative
history can be less reliable, and that legislative history in general serves certain
functions separate from guiding judicial interpretation—notably as a tool of
agency oversight and as a form of political communication with the public.102
Still, over ninety percent of those surveyed stated that drafters use legislative
history to explain a statute’s purpose and to indicate the meaning of specific
terms in the text, as well as to set forth in layman’s terms, for other members
and staff, what the proposed statute does and how it fits in with older
legislation.103
In sum, for both members of Congress and their key staff, legislative
history contributes in essential ways to the enactment process. Congressional
actors who draft, negotiate, and vote on text are well aware of Justice Scalia’s
contentions that legislative history is illegitimate, unreliable, and unworthy of

97. Michael S. Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 841 (1991).
98. See Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 49, at 149–51 and sources cited
therein.
99. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 38, at 606–07.
100. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16.
101. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 55–57; see also Katzmann, Statutes, supra note 91, at 659–60 (discussing the high
value that agencies place on reliable legislative history when implementing legislation).
103. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16 (manuscript at 56–57).
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consideration by courts.104 But as lawmaking principals, they remain
committed to the relevance and probative value of this legislative record
evidence.105 Judges who refuse to consider such evidence in the name of
ordinary meaning analysis can hardly be said to act as faithful agents.
2.

The Court’s Approach

Unlike Justices Scalia and Thomas, most Justices do not categorically
disregard legislative history. Rather, the Court as a whole has long understood
that the value of legislative record evidence is best approached as a matter of
weight rather than admissibility, of more or less rather than all or nothing.106
Moreover, and importantly, the Court’s presumptive hierarchy of reliable
legislative history sources depends heavily on what it understands to be the
structure of congressional lawmaking.
Thus, standing committee and conference committee reports traditionally
are accorded the most weight.107 This priority reflects awareness that busy
legislators trust their colleagues on the committees responsible for drafting and
negotiating about the contested text,108 and that committee reports explaining
and justifying this text “presumably are well considered and carefully
prepared.”109 Explanatory floor statements by bill or amendment sponsors
receive almost as much attention, because timely explanations by the sponsor
of the language ultimately enacted are deemed “an authoritative guide to the
statute’s construction.”110 Conversely, the Court considers statements by bill
opponents and also subsequent legislative history to be unreliable.111 These
participants lack authoritative status, either because as opponents, or “losers,”

104. See, e.g., Roberts Hearing, supra note 93, at 318–19 (statement of Sen. Charles
Grassley); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 38, at 607; Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16
(manuscript at 27).
105. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 38, at 607.
106. See generally Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 49, at 146–60, and
cases cited therein.
107. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984); Simpson v. United States, 435
U.S. 6, 17 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft,
& Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 585–86 (1957).
108. Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276–77 (1996)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
109. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
110. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526–27 (1982); see also Corley v. United
States, 556 U.S. 303, 318 (2009); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Oh. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 190 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
111. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 196 (1998) (discounting opposition
statements); Shell Oil v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 29 (1988) (same); see also Heintz
v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995) (rejecting post-enactment legislative history); Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117–18 (1980) (same).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

994

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:975

their explanations carry no more weight than a dissenting appellate court
opinion,112 or because as post-hoc observers their remarks could not have
influenced colleagues who were considering how to vote.113
The Court’s presumptive hierarchy of legislative history is based on which
sources members of Congress, acting individually and institutionally, regard as
trustworthy.114 By relying on its assessment of what Congress as principal
considers more, or less, trustworthy, the Court would seem to be operating as
an agent when construing legislative record evidence.
In addition to following the same basic hierarchy as legislators and their
staffs, the Court also seems to understand how certain types of legislative
history may serve distinct purposes in different subject areas. Thus, in tax law,
where legislation tends to be reported out of committee as a bipartisan, interbranch collaborative effort,115 the Court, when it invokes legislative history,
relies on standing committee reports three-fourths of the time while largely
ignoring or discounting floor statements and even conference reports.116 These
committee reports reflect an accumulated body of expertise from all key
players, and the Court often relies on the reports essentially for expertiseborrowing purposes.117 By contrast, in labor and employment law, legislation
is typically reported from committee with lengthy minority views and is often
modified on the floor or in conference.118 The Court, when relying on
legislative history, is far more likely to consult Senate or House floor debates
and conference reports, while invoking committee reports substantially less
than in the tax area.119 Its pattern of reliance in these labor and civil rights

112. Nourse, supra note 94, at 118–20.
113. The Court’s rankings are strong presumptions rather than hard rules. Committee reports
may be of limited value if the report commentary is silent with respect to the provision in dispute
or if the provision was added to the bill as a floor amendment. See Nourse, supra note 94, at 98–
109 (discussing why history accompanying later textual provisions should trump history
explaining earlier-drafted portions or versions of the text). And post-enactment history may be
more reliable in certain limited circumstances if it represents an integral part of the shared
understanding reached by Congress as a whole. See James J. Brudney, Congressional
Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 90–91, 97–99 (1994) [hereinafter Brudney, Congressional Commentary] (discussing
two such instances). Importantly, these departures from the Court’s presumptions also are
grounded in perceptions of what legislators regard as trustworthy or reliable statements in
furtherance of the enactment process.
114. See Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons From Positive
Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 974 (2007).
115. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
116. See Brudney & Ditslear, Warp & Woof, supra note 10, at 1260–65.
117. Id. at 1283–91 (reviewing a number of the Court’s expertise-borrowing majority
opinions between 1970 and 1990).
118. Id. at 1262, 1282.
119. Id. at 1263–65.
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decisions reflects an effort to understand the precise contours of the legislative
bargain that was struck.120 In both the tax law and labor law examples, the
Court’s use of legislative history displays a nuanced, albeit unarticulated,
appreciation for the different ways in which Congress approaches the process
of building a sufficient lawmaking consensus.
As was the case with ordinary meaning, faithful agency is not the only
basis from which to assess or understand the value of legislative history as a
judicial resource. There are criticisms of its value or reliability based on other
factors such as its accessibility, its complexity, and its susceptibility to misuse
by staff or members with their own agendas.121 Those arguments warrant
serious consideration, and they have been addressed elsewhere by judges and
legal scholars.122 What matters for present purposes, however, is the concept of
faithful agency. In contrast to the dictionary and language canons that form the
foundation of ordinary meaning analysis, invoking legislative history as an
interpretive resource is fundamentally consistent with the role of the judge as a
faithful agent.
CONCLUSION
Ordinary meaning jurists and their supporters contend that courts are
acting as faithful agents because the text is both the one legitimate and the one
knowable product of the lawmaking process. With respect to faithful agency,
the legitimacy of the text is something of a red herring. All major approaches
to statutory interpretation recognize that the text is the only manifestation of
“law” and is therefore the starting point for any responsible analysis. But in the
hard cases where the meaning of that text is inconclusive or reasonably
disputed, courts consult legislative history for the same legitimate reasons they
consult the dictionary, the canons, or prior agency practice. All these resources
can help a court to attribute meaning to the contested text by offering a more
complete understanding of the written communication that Congress has
enacted.
As for what is knowable about legislative bargains, this Article has
reviewed considerable evidence from those who consummate the bargains and
from the Court’s own practices in construing them. Based on that evidence,

120. Brudney & Ditslear, Legislative History, supra note 49, at 146–53.
121. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 861–62, 864–69 (1992) (considering various practical arguments for
devaluing or disregarding legislative history); George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and
Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and
Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE. L.J. 39, 60–72 (same).
122. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 121, at 861–62, 864–69; Brudney, Congressional
Commentary, supra note 113, at 47–56; Costello, supra note 121, at 60–72; Zeppos, supra note
12, at 1310–35.
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reliance on dictionaries and language canons—the twin pillars of ordinary
meaning analysis—is difficult to justify in terms of advancing the Court’s role
as faithful agent. Congress’s self-conscious practices when drafting and
agreeing upon text, practices regularly explained by legislators and key staff,
indicate that neither resource contributes seriously to lawmaking processes or
to the final product. And the Court’s record of invoking dictionaries and
language canons indicates that the Justices often use each resource to ignore or
reject the terms of a legislative bargain.
Judicial reliance on dictionaries or language canons may be defended on
other grounds, such as their accessibility, their asserted objectivity, and their
attempt to promote clarity or predictability.123 We should recognize, however,
that for Congress these interpretive assets do not occupy a favored position in
the enactment or interpretive processes.
Reliance on legislative history comes closer to reflecting Congress’s
preferences as lawmaking principal. Legislators and staff use this history to
explain, and at times enhance, the statutory work product by avoiding an
unnaturally confining quest for linguistic precision as Congress strives for
sufficient consensus to secure passage. And the Court’s record of nuanced
appreciation for legislative history—its presumptive hierarchy of specific
sources and its identifiably distinct use of those sources with respect to
different subject matter areas—reflects that most Justices understand the
relationship between the legislative record and Congress’s processes for
drafting, negotiating, and enacting a statutory bargain.
Problems of misuse or abuse exist for legislative history as they do for all
interpretive resources. Thus, there is every reason for judges to be vigilant
about applying this history,124 something both legislative staff and courts
understand.125 In the end, such vigilance is worth the candle if the Court is to
respect legislative supremacy and perform as Congress’s agent in this
interpretive endeavor.

123. But cf. Brudney & Baum, supra note 9 (manuscript at 5, 7–8) (questioning whether
dictionaries as used by the Justices promote objectivity or predictability); Brudney & Ditslear,
Canons, supra note 46, at 9–10 (raising similar questions about the canons).
124. See generally Nourse, supra note 94.
125. See generally Gluck & Bressman, supra note 16.

